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	<title>Comments for Shaheen N Abdul Jabbar</title>
	<atom:link href="http://snajsoft.com/comments/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://snajsoft.com</link>
	<description>Software Engineer &#62; Security Officer &#62; Security Architect</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Fri, 22 Jan 2010 17:46:05 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>Comment on Security Must Haves in a SaaS Provider by Shaheen Abdul Jabbar</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/12/29/security-must-haves-in-a-saas-provider/comment-page-1/#comment-31</link>
		<dc:creator>Shaheen Abdul Jabbar</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Jan 2010 17:46:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=238#comment-31</guid>
		<description>I have tried using this checklist to conduct couple of vendor assessments. As some of you said, this is an exhaustive one and a SaaS vendor may not be able to meet all of them. Some of the requirements are achieved through contracts. Those few items that cannot be complied may need to be accepted as risk.

The vendors I have met so far are willing to meet all of them. They may need some time to achieve the target - they are learning as the industry grows. From the vendor’s point of view, wouldn’t they want to appear as a secure service for their customers?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have tried using this checklist to conduct couple of vendor assessments. As some of you said, this is an exhaustive one and a SaaS vendor may not be able to meet all of them. Some of the requirements are achieved through contracts. Those few items that cannot be complied may need to be accepted as risk.</p>
<p>The vendors I have met so far are willing to meet all of them. They may need some time to achieve the target &#8211; they are learning as the industry grows. From the vendor’s point of view, wouldn’t they want to appear as a secure service for their customers?</p>
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		<title>Comment on Security Must Haves in a SaaS Provider by Thomas Dager</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/12/29/security-must-haves-in-a-saas-provider/comment-page-1/#comment-30</link>
		<dc:creator>Thomas Dager</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 17:43:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=238#comment-30</guid>
		<description>I agree...the list is interesting, but also very one-sided and not grounded in reality.

There is no way any SaaS is going to agree to all of those points.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree&#8230;the list is interesting, but also very one-sided and not grounded in reality.</p>
<p>There is no way any SaaS is going to agree to all of those points.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Security Must Haves in a SaaS Provider by Samir Pawaskar</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/12/29/security-must-haves-in-a-saas-provider/comment-page-1/#comment-29</link>
		<dc:creator>Samir Pawaskar</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 17:42:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=238#comment-29</guid>
		<description>The list is interesting. The only problem or lets say concern I have is will any SaaS / cloud computing provider be able to comply with this?

Or in other words have you successfully evaluated any any cloud computing provider against this checklist.

I would be interested to know them...

Thanks and Regards
Samir</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The list is interesting. The only problem or lets say concern I have is will any SaaS / cloud computing provider be able to comply with this?</p>
<p>Or in other words have you successfully evaluated any any cloud computing provider against this checklist.</p>
<p>I would be interested to know them&#8230;</p>
<p>Thanks and Regards<br />
Samir</p>
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		<title>Comment on Happy Holidays &amp; New Year by Waseem Azmi</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/12/24/happy-holidays-new-year-2010/comment-page-1/#comment-28</link>
		<dc:creator>Waseem Azmi</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Dec 2009 16:36:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=230#comment-28</guid>
		<description>Thanks Shaheen! Wish you and your family too a very happy and blessed new year ahead.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks Shaheen! Wish you and your family too a very happy and blessed new year ahead.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Happy Holidays &amp; New Year by Marty Shapiro</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/12/24/happy-holidays-new-year-2010/comment-page-1/#comment-27</link>
		<dc:creator>Marty Shapiro</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Dec 2009 14:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=230#comment-27</guid>
		<description>Hi Shaheen,

All the best to you and your family.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Shaheen,</p>
<p>All the best to you and your family.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Happy Holidays &amp; New Year by Renju</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/12/24/happy-holidays-new-year-2010/comment-page-1/#comment-26</link>
		<dc:creator>Renju</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Dec 2009 03:49:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=230#comment-26</guid>
		<description>Happy Newyear!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Happy Newyear!</p>
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		<title>Comment on Happy Holidays &amp; New Year by Karun Ganesharatnam</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/12/24/happy-holidays-new-year-2010/comment-page-1/#comment-25</link>
		<dc:creator>Karun Ganesharatnam</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Dec 2009 16:45:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=230#comment-25</guid>
		<description>Thanks. You too have Happy Holidays and New Year!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks. You too have Happy Holidays and New Year!</p>
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		<title>Comment on Placing a Vulnerability Assessment Scanner by Shaheen Abdul Jabbar</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/10/24/placing-a-vulnerability-assessment-scanner/comment-page-1/#comment-24</link>
		<dc:creator>Shaheen Abdul Jabbar</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2009 16:10:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=208#comment-24</guid>
		<description>Thank you all for your suggestions and great advices. I believe option 3 is the most favored one. Thanks once again for your participation in this discussion.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thank you all for your suggestions and great advices. I believe option 3 is the most favored one. Thanks once again for your participation in this discussion.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Placing a Vulnerability Assessment Scanner by Jeff Bennison</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/10/24/placing-a-vulnerability-assessment-scanner/comment-page-1/#comment-23</link>
		<dc:creator>Jeff Bennison</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2009 16:09:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=208#comment-23</guid>
		<description>There are some options from a company called Outpost24 based in Sweden. They could supply two products. The first would be Outscan which scans from the outside and HIAB (Hacker in a Box) sits inside your network so can scan internally. I can confirm they are reasonably priced. The nice feature is they are third party (good for audit/compliance) but you manage everything including the ip ranges and scheduling so no surprising alerts from IDS/IPS systems. Take a look here  http://www.outpost24.com  and drop me a message if you would like a contact name who can discuss pricing. Oh by the way I am in no way affiliated with this company or product and receive nothing either cash or otherwise from recommending them.
Cheers

Jeff</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are some options from a company called Outpost24 based in Sweden. They could supply two products. The first would be Outscan which scans from the outside and HIAB (Hacker in a Box) sits inside your network so can scan internally. I can confirm they are reasonably priced. The nice feature is they are third party (good for audit/compliance) but you manage everything including the ip ranges and scheduling so no surprising alerts from IDS/IPS systems. Take a look here  <a href="http://www.outpost24.com" rel="nofollow">http://www.outpost24.com</a>  and drop me a message if you would like a contact name who can discuss pricing. Oh by the way I am in no way affiliated with this company or product and receive nothing either cash or otherwise from recommending them.<br />
Cheers</p>
<p>Jeff</p>
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		<title>Comment on Placing a Vulnerability Assessment Scanner by Anthony Appel</title>
		<link>http://snajsoft.com/2009/10/24/placing-a-vulnerability-assessment-scanner/comment-page-1/#comment-22</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony Appel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2009 05:01:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://snajsoft.com/?p=208#comment-22</guid>
		<description>Unfortunately I&#039;ve had the opportunity of dealing with this type of situation and Patten is 100% correct on this being the cost/performance/security model.

I&#039;m assuming this isn&#039;t a PCI requirement, as you are required for external scans to be 3rd party, but can do internal scans yourself.

I&#039;m somewhat of a firm believer that while the external scans are important, they are by far the easiest to implement due to one device to many. I do personally believe that internal scans are very important. If a hacker can make it in much of the time it is free game on lets say a botnet cloud once he gets in. While many people harden the exterior they seen to forget most of the vulnerabilities internally. If you do get a 0day hacker, your external vulnerability scanning is hit and miss, it&#039;s always a timing issue. If you only have the external scans and get exploited from a 0day, you might not notice the internal threat until it&#039;s too late. This is obviously mitigated by devices that do profiling such as a Juniper IDP that detects internal anomalies. Your &quot;internal&quot; scanner though might not catch it immediately but it will see it after the vulnerabilities get posted a few days later which might be sufficient. I find 0day anomaly scanners to be very inconsistent in general anyway. While most of the vulnerability scanners are solid, you might have to wait a few days due to the signature discovery delay to be found. It really depends on network infrastructure and if you are utilizing profiling/IPS internally.

For remote sites I personally would like a scanner internally and not in the DMZ. I would utilize a scanner for DMZ things remotely, like from your base office. Imo, it doesn&#039;t really need to be placed physically inside the remote sites DMZ&#039;s. Theoretically what a hacker was seeing you could implement a scan remotely to see his perceptive on the situation - granted this isn&#039;t ideal, but in theory people should not be able to make it down once they compromise the DMZ due to natting and a firewall in between internal resources . Your internal scanner however protects more things because it can find things after the initial hack, where your external scanner might not. Ideally you would have both a internal/external scanner for every site (yes we can all dream can&#039;t we).

Whatever you do don&#039;t bridge the streams (awesome ghostbusters reference I patted myself on the back as I typed this one handed). I&#039;ve seen instances of people slapping a qualys with one port in the DMZ and one port internally. I&#039;m a firm believer with physically seperating as much as possible DMZ/internal, unless you are really moving towards a cohesive model with DLP implemented (if you are not familiar with this, it&#039;s the &quot;new&quot; buzz word of not having a perimeter but having overall security within the realm, it does away with layers models) personally I don&#039;t think we are at that point with our security technologies. I also see alot of situations where people are using vlan, or other logical boundaries from DMZ to internal, especially with VM farms. It&#039;s always a good rule of thumb that any backplane can usually be compromised if the hacker knows what they are doing, and it is completely out of our control.

At our current stage I think it becomes an issue on what your layers look like. Are your remote offices just logically vlaned from DMZ to internal? If that is the case, then having a scanner on multiple vlans is not that big of an issue, as they are considered hardened devices and you probably have less &quot;hardened&quot; devices. A internal scanner while doing the external scans from the home office would be more ideal imo though, and these obviously mitigated by good IPS/IDP as well. It really depends on how sensitive your data is at the remote sites as well.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Unfortunately I&#8217;ve had the opportunity of dealing with this type of situation and Patten is 100% correct on this being the cost/performance/security model.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m assuming this isn&#8217;t a PCI requirement, as you are required for external scans to be 3rd party, but can do internal scans yourself.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m somewhat of a firm believer that while the external scans are important, they are by far the easiest to implement due to one device to many. I do personally believe that internal scans are very important. If a hacker can make it in much of the time it is free game on lets say a botnet cloud once he gets in. While many people harden the exterior they seen to forget most of the vulnerabilities internally. If you do get a 0day hacker, your external vulnerability scanning is hit and miss, it&#8217;s always a timing issue. If you only have the external scans and get exploited from a 0day, you might not notice the internal threat until it&#8217;s too late. This is obviously mitigated by devices that do profiling such as a Juniper IDP that detects internal anomalies. Your &#8220;internal&#8221; scanner though might not catch it immediately but it will see it after the vulnerabilities get posted a few days later which might be sufficient. I find 0day anomaly scanners to be very inconsistent in general anyway. While most of the vulnerability scanners are solid, you might have to wait a few days due to the signature discovery delay to be found. It really depends on network infrastructure and if you are utilizing profiling/IPS internally.</p>
<p>For remote sites I personally would like a scanner internally and not in the DMZ. I would utilize a scanner for DMZ things remotely, like from your base office. Imo, it doesn&#8217;t really need to be placed physically inside the remote sites DMZ&#8217;s. Theoretically what a hacker was seeing you could implement a scan remotely to see his perceptive on the situation &#8211; granted this isn&#8217;t ideal, but in theory people should not be able to make it down once they compromise the DMZ due to natting and a firewall in between internal resources . Your internal scanner however protects more things because it can find things after the initial hack, where your external scanner might not. Ideally you would have both a internal/external scanner for every site (yes we can all dream can&#8217;t we).</p>
<p>Whatever you do don&#8217;t bridge the streams (awesome ghostbusters reference I patted myself on the back as I typed this one handed). I&#8217;ve seen instances of people slapping a qualys with one port in the DMZ and one port internally. I&#8217;m a firm believer with physically seperating as much as possible DMZ/internal, unless you are really moving towards a cohesive model with DLP implemented (if you are not familiar with this, it&#8217;s the &#8220;new&#8221; buzz word of not having a perimeter but having overall security within the realm, it does away with layers models) personally I don&#8217;t think we are at that point with our security technologies. I also see alot of situations where people are using vlan, or other logical boundaries from DMZ to internal, especially with VM farms. It&#8217;s always a good rule of thumb that any backplane can usually be compromised if the hacker knows what they are doing, and it is completely out of our control.</p>
<p>At our current stage I think it becomes an issue on what your layers look like. Are your remote offices just logically vlaned from DMZ to internal? If that is the case, then having a scanner on multiple vlans is not that big of an issue, as they are considered hardened devices and you probably have less &#8220;hardened&#8221; devices. A internal scanner while doing the external scans from the home office would be more ideal imo though, and these obviously mitigated by good IPS/IDP as well. It really depends on how sensitive your data is at the remote sites as well.</p>
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